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Abstract: 
This paper examines the optimal production and export decisions of an international firm facing exchange rate 
uncertainty when the firm's preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity is modeled by a second-order 
probability distribution that captures the firm's uncertainty about which of the subjective beliefs govern the exchange 
rate risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second-order) expectation of a concave transformation of the ( 
first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution of the exchange rate risk. 
Within this framework, we show that ambiguity has no impact on the firm's propensity to export to a foreign country. 
Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, however, are shown to have adverse effect on the firm's 
incentive to export to the foreign country. 
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1. Introduction
The study of an international firm under exchange rate uncertainty has been the subject
of considerable research in decision making under uncertainty (Katz and Paroush, 1979;
Kawai and Zilcha, 1986; Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Viaene and Zilcha, 1998; Wong, 2007;
to name just a few). The extant literature examines the production and export decisions
of the international firm using the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
representation. Such a modeling approach rules out the possibility that the firm is unable
to unambiguously assign a probability distribution that uniquely describes the exchange
rate risk, which gives rise to ambiguity, or uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921).
Since the seminal work of Ellsberg, ambiguity has been alluded to the violation of
the independence axiom, which is responsible for the decision criterion being linear in the
outcome probabilities. There are ample experiments (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Sarin and
Weber, 1993; Chow and Sarin, 2001) and surveys (; Viscusi and Chesson, 1999; Chesson and
Viscusi, 2003; Eichberger et al., 2008) that document convincing evidence that individuals
prefer gambles with known rather than unknown probabilities, implying that ambiguity
aversion prevails.
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate ambiguity into the model of an international
firm under exchange rate uncertainty. Klibanoff et al. (2005) have recently developed a
powerful decision criterion known as “smooth ambiguity aversion” that is compatible with
ambiguity averse preferences under uncertainty (hereafter referred to as the KMM model).
The KMM model features the recursive structure that is far more tractable in comparison to
other models of ambiguity such as the pioneering maxmin expected utility (or multiple-prior)
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Specifically, the KMM model represents ambiguity
by a second-order probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about which
of the subjective beliefs govern the price risk. The KMM model then measures the firm’s
expected utility under ambiguity by taking the (second-order) expectation of a concave
2
transformation of the (first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible
subjective distribution of the price risk. This recursive structure creates a crisp separation
between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion, i.e., between beliefs and tastes, which allows
us to study these two attributes independently. Another nice feature of the KMM model
is that we can apply the conventional techniques in the decision making under uncertainty
in the context of ambiguity (Taboga, 2005; Gollier, 2011; Snow, 2010, 2011; Alary et al.,
2013).
Within the KMM model, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition under which
the ambiguity-averse firm optimally refrains from exporting to a foreign country. This
condition applies irrespective of whether ambiguity is present or not. Ambiguity as such
has no impact on the firm’s propensity to export. Since exporting to the foreign country
exposes the firm to the exchange rate risk, the prevalence of ambiguity creates additional
risk to the ambiguity-averse firm. Hence, the firm finds it less attractive to export to the
foreign country in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity. This result extends to the
case of greater ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity and ambiguity aversion as such have adverse
effect on the firm’s incentive to export.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the KMM model of
an international firm under exchange rate uncertainty. Section 3 examine how ambiguity
and ambiguity aversion affect the firm’s optimal production and export decisions. The final
section concludes.
2. The model
Consider an international firm that faces exchange rate uncertainty. There is one period
with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the firm produces a single homogeneous good in the
home country according to a known cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the level of output,
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C(0) = C ′(0) = 0, and C ′(Q) > 0 and C ′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.1 The firm also has to
decide how to allocate its entire output, Q, between domestic sales and foreign exports.
Specifically, the firm commits to selling Qd units of the good in the home market and
exporting the rest, Qf = Q−Qd, to a foreign country at t = 1, where 0 ≤ Qd ≤ Q.
We model the exchange rate uncertainty by a random variable, S˜, that denotes the spot
exchange rate at t = 1 and is expressed in units of the home currency per unit of the foreign
currency.2 The spot exchange rate, S˜, is distributed according to an objective cumulative
distribution function, H(S), over support [S, S], where 0 < S < S. The firm, however, is
uncertain about H(S) and thus faces ambiguity. Let F (S|θ) be the firm’s subjective cumu-
lative distribution function of S˜ over support [S, S], where θ is the realization of an unknown
parameter, θ˜. The KMM model represents ambiguity by a second-order subjective cumu-
lative distribution function of θ˜, G(θ), over support [θ, θ] with θ < θ, which captures the
firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective cumulative distribution function, F (S|θ),
governs the random spot exchange rate, S˜. Following Snow (2010, 2011), we assume that
the firm’s ambiguous beliefs are unbiased in the sense that the expected exchange rate risk
is equal to the objective exchange rate risk:
∫ θ
θ
F (S|θ)dG(θ) = H(S), (1)
for all S ∈ [S, S].3
The firm is competitive in both the home and foreign markets. The selling price in
the home market is Pd per unit, where Pd > 0 is denominated in the home currency. On
the other hand, the selling price in the foreign market is Pf per unit, where Pf > 0 is
denominated in the foreign currency.4 The firm’s profit at date 1, denominated in the home
1The strict convexity of the cost function reflects the fact that the firm’s production technology exhibits
decreasing returns to scale.
2Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
3The assumption that the expected exchange rate risk is equal to the objective exchange rate risk is
motivated by the premise that the behavior of an ambiguity-neutral decision maker should be unaffected by
the introduction of, or changes in, ambiguity.
4Due to the segmentation of the home and foreign markets, arbitrage transactions are either impossible or
unprofitable, thereby invalidating the law of one price. See Engel and Rogers (1996, 2001) and Parsley and
Wei (1996) for supportive evidence that arbitrage transactions among national markets are indeed imperfect.
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currency, is given by Π˜ = PdQd+ S˜PfQf−C(Q), where Q = Qd+Qf . To have a non-trivial
problem, we assume that SPf < Pd < SPf so that neither domestic sales dominate nor
are dominated by foreign exports for sure. The firm possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function, U(Π), defined over its home currency profit at date 1, Π, with U ′(Π) > 0
and U ′′(Π) < 0, indicating the presence of risk aversion.
The recursive structure of the KMM model implies that we can compute the firm’s ex-
pected utility under ambiguity in three steps. First, we calculate the firm’s expected utility
for each subjective cumulative distribution function of S˜. Second, we transform each (first-
order) expected utility obtained in the first step via an increasing function, ϕ(·). Finally,
we take the (second-order) expectation of the transformed expected utility obtained in the
second step with respect to the second-order subjective cumulative distribution function of
θ˜. The firm’s ex-ante decision problem as such is given by
max
Qd≥0,Qf≥0
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ P
P
U [PdQd + SPfQf − C(Q)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ). (2)
Inspection of the objective function of program (2) reveals that the effect of ambiguity,
represented by the cumulative distribution function, G(θ), and the effect of ambiguity pref-
erences, represented by the shape of the ambiguity function, ϕ(·), can be separated and
thus studied independently.
We say that the firm is ambiguity averse if, for any given pair of domestic sales and
foreign exports, (Qd, Qf ), the objective function of program (2) decreases when the firm’s
ambiguous beliefs, specified by G(θ), change in a way that induces a mean-preserving spread
in the distribution of the firm’s expected utility. According to this definition, Klibanoff et
al. (2005) show that ambiguity aversion implies concavity for ϕ(·), and that a concave
transformation of ϕ(·) results in greater ambiguity aversion. Throughout the paper, we
assume that ϕ(·) satisfies that ϕ′(·) > 0 and ϕ′′(·) < 0, implying that the firm is ambiguity
averse.
5
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for program (2) are given by
∫ θ
θ
∫ S
S
ϕ′
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)
}
×U ′[PdQ∗d + SPfQ∗f − C(Q)][Pd − C ′(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)dG(θ) ≤ 0, (3)
and
∫ θ
θ
∫ S
S
ϕ′
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)
}
×U ′[PdQ∗d + SPfQ∗f − C(Q)][SPf − C ′(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)dG(θ) ≤ 0, (4)
where Q∗d and Q
∗
f are the firm’s optimal domestic sales and foreign exports, respectively,
and Q∗ = Q∗d + Q
∗
f . The second-order conditions for program (2) are satisfied given the
assumed properties of ϕ(·), U(Π), and C(Q).
3. The impact of ambiguity on exports
We first derive conditions under which domestic sales dominate foreign exports, i.e.,
Q∗d > 0 and Q
∗
f = 0. Denote Q
◦ as the solution to C ′(Q◦) = Pd. Since Q∗d > 0 and Q
∗
f = 0,
condition (3) holds with equality and becomes
ϕ′{U [PdQ∗d − C(Q∗d)]}U ′[PdQ∗d − C(Q∗d)][Pd − C ′(Q∗d)] = 0. (5)
It then follows from Eq. (5) that Q∗d = Q
◦. Condition (4) holds as an inequality at Q∗d = Q
◦
and Q∗f = 0, which becomes
C ′(Q◦) ≥
∫ θ
θ
∫ S
S
SPfdF (S|θ)dG(θ) =
∫ S
S
SPfdH(S), (6)
where the equality follows from Eq. (1). Hence, we establish our first proposition.
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Proposition 1. The ambiguity-averse international firm optimally refrains from exporting
to the foreign country, i.e., Q∗f = 0, if, and only if, the following condition holds:
Pd ≥
∫ θ
θ
∫ S
S
SPfdF (S|θ)dG(θ) =
∫ S
S
SPfdH(S). (7)
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. The marginal revenue from domestic sales
is certain and equal to Pd. Exporting to the foreign country, however, exposes the firm
to the exchange rate risk. The firm, being risk averse and ambiguity averse, has to be
compensated for bearing the exchange rate risk. Domestic sales as such dominate foreign
exports if, and only if, the expected marginal revenue from the latter does not exceed the
marginal revenue from the former. This condition applies irrespective of whether ambiguity
is present or not. Hence, ambiguity has no impact on the firm’s propensity to export to the
foreign country.
Given that condition (7) does not hold, the firm optimally chooses Q∗f > 0. The firm
must attain a higher value of its objective function of program (2) than in the case that
exporting to the foreign country is prohibited:
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ) > ϕ{U [PdQ◦ − C(Q◦)]}. (8)
Let W ∗ be the solution to
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ)
= ϕ{U [PdQ◦ − C(Q◦) +W ∗]}. (9)
Eqs. (8) and (9) imply that W ∗ > 0, which captures the compensation demanded by the
firm to give up the privilege of exporting to the foreign country.
Let Q†d and Q
†
f be the firm’s optimal domestic sales and foreign exports, respectively,
when the firm faces no ambiguity, i.e., F (S|θ) = H(S) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] and S ∈ [S, S]. Given
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that condition (7) does not hold, we have Q†f > 0. Hence, the firm needs to be compensated
if it has to give up the privilege of exporting to the foreign country. The compensation in
the absence of ambiguity, W † > 0, must be the solution to
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
†
d + SPfQ
†
f − C(Q†)]dH(S)
}
= ϕ{U [PdQ◦ − C(Q◦) +W †]}. (10)
Comparing W ∗ and W † yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given that condition (7) does not hold, introducing ambiguity to the
ambiguity-averse international firm reduces the compensation demanded by the firm to give
up the privilege of exporting to the foreign country.
Proof. Since ϕ′′(·) < 0, Jensen’s inequality implies that
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ)
< ϕ
{∫ θ
θ
∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)dG(θ)
}
= ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dH(S)
}
, (11)
where the equality follows from Eq. (1). Since Q†d and Q
†
f are the firm’s optimal domestic
sales and foreign exports, respectively, in the absence of ambiguity, it must be true that
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
†
d + SPfQ
†
f − C(Q†)]dH(S)
}
> ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dH(S)
}
. (12)
Eqs. (11) and (12) imply that
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ)
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< ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
†
d + SPfQ
†
f − C(Q†)]dH(S)
}
. (13)
It then follows from Eqs. (9), (10), and (13) that W ∗ < W †. 2
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. Exporting to the foreign country exposes
the firm to the exchange rate risk. The presence of ambiguity creates additional risk to the
ambiguity-averse firm. Hence, the firm finds it less attractive to export to the foreign country
in the presence than in the absence of ambiguity, rendering that W ∗ < W †. Ambiguity as
such reduces the value to export.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that the firm becomes more ambiguity averse when ϕ(·)
is replaced by K[ϕ(·)] in the objective function of program (2), where K(·) satisfies that
K ′(·) > 0 and K ′′(·) < 0. Let Qd and Qf be the optimal domestic sales and foreign sales,
respectively, when the firm’s smooth ambiguity preferences are represented by K[ϕ(·)].
Given that condition (7) does not hold, we have Qf > 0. The compensation demanded by
the more ambiguity-averse firm to give up the privilege of exporting to the foreign country,
W † > 0, must be the solution to
∫ θ
θ
K
{
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ

d + SPfQ

f − C(Q)]dF (S|θ)
}}
dG(θ)
= K
{
ϕ{U [PdQ◦ − C(Q◦) +W ]}
}
. (14)
Comparing W ∗ and W  yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given that condition (7) does not hold, making the ambiguity-averse
international firm more ambiguity averse reduces the compensation demanded by the firm
to give up the privilege of exporting to the foreign country.
9
Proof. Since K ′′(·) < 0, Jensen’s inequality implies that
∫ θ
θ
K
{
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ

d + SPfQ

f − C(Q)]dF (S|θ)
}}
dG(θ)
< K
{∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ

d + SPfQ

f − C(Q)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ)
}
. (15)
Since Q∗d and Q
∗
f are the optimal domestic sales and foreign sales, respectively, when the
firm’s smooth ambiguity preferences are represented by ϕ(·), it must be true that
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ)
>
∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ

d + SPfQ

f − C(Q)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ). (16)
Eqs. (15) and (16) imply that
∫ θ
θ
K
{
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ

d + SPfQ

f − C(Q)]dF (S|θ)
}}
dG(θ)
< K
{∫ θ
θ
ϕ
{∫ S
S
U [PdQ
∗
d + SPfQ
∗
f − C(Q∗)]dF (S|θ)
}
dG(θ)
}
. (17)
It then follows from Eqs. (9), (14), and (17) that W  < W ∗. 2
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. When the firm is more ambiguity averse,
exporting to the foreign country becomes less attractive as the firm has to be exposed to
the exchange rate risk. Hence, the compensation demanded by the firm to give up the
privilege of exporting to the foreign country decreases in a systematic manner with greater
ambiguity aversion.
4. Conclusion
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In this paper, we have examined the production and export decisions of an international
firm under exchange rate uncertainty when the firm’s preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity
aversion developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005). The KMM model represents ambiguity by
a second-order probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of
the subjective beliefs govern the exchange rate risk. On the other hand, the KMM model
specifies ambiguity preferences by the (second-order) expectation of a concave transforma-
tion of the (first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective
distribution of the exchange rate risk. Within this framework, we have shown that the
ambiguity-averse firm optimally refrains from exporting to a foreign country if, and only if,
the expected marginal revenue from foreign exports does not exceed the marginal revenue
from domestic sales. This condition applies irrespective of whether ambiguity is present or
not. Hence, ambiguity has no impact on the firm’s propensity to export. We have further
shown that the firm finds it less attractive to export to the foreign country in the presence
than in the absence of ambiguity, and with greater ambiguity aversion. The value of export
as such decreases when ambiguity and ambiguity aversion prevail.
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